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Abstract: 
This paper investigates the effect of the 2014 Affordable Care Act preexisting conditions 
provision on marriage. The policy was implemented to prevent insurers from denying insurance 
coverage to individuals with health conditions. We test whether the implementation of the 
provision led to decreases in marriage among affected adults. We add to earlier work on how 
marital behavior is influenced by policy incentives and examine for WKHSUHVHQFHRI³PDUULDJH
ORFN´, a situation in which individuals remain married primarily for insurance. Using data from 
2009-2015 and difference-in-differences models, we find that males with preexisting conditions 
are 5.15 percentage points (6.40 percent) less likely to be married after the policy 
implementation. Effects are largest for men who had insurance coverage prior to the policy 
change from a source other than his own employer, suggesting that the inability to attain 
individual coverage and reliance on spousal insurance provided incentives to remain married. 
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1. Introduction 
In 2010, The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) was enacted by 
Congress with goals, among others, to ensure that individuals with preexisting conditions are not 
denied access to affordable health insurance plans. The ACA has been credited with reducing the 
number of Americans lacking health insurance coverage by about 20 million, leading to a 
historic low (Avery et al., 2016; Uberoi et al., 2016) and with lessening the effects of job lock 
among parents of children with chronic conditions (Chatterji et al., 2016). While the reduction of 
uninsured individuals was a major goal of the ACA, large changes in policy also come with 
XQLQWHQGHGHIIHFWV5HFHQWVWXGLHVKDYHVKRZQWKDWWKH$&$¶VGHSHQGHQWFRYHUDJHPDQGDWH
which expanded insurance coverage for young adults by allowing them to remain on parental 
plans until the age of 26, led to reductions in labor supply (Akosa Antwi et al., 2013; Lenhart and 
Shrestha, 2016; Colman and Dave, 2018), declines in college enrollment (Jung and Shrestha, 
2018), and decreases in fertility (Abramowitz, 2018). It remains important to continue to study 
the ACA to direct policymakers toward a more developed understanding of the policy.  
Our study examines the ACA prohibition of denying individuals insurance coverage 
based on preexisting conditions, which was implemented on January 1, 2014 for adults, and its 
impact on marriage.1 Claxton et al. (2016) estimate that over 27 percent (52 million) of adult 
Americans under the age of 65 have health conditions that would have made them uninsurable 
under pre-ACA laws. We test whether the preexisting conditions provision affected marital 
decisions of individuals who may have been denied coverage prior to enactment of the policy. In 
a pre-ACA world, it is easy to imagine a scenario in which an individual with health conditions 
may feel particularly reliant on his or her marriage for reasons of procuring affordable health 
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 The preexisting conditions provision took effect in 2010 for children. 
insurance. After implementation of the policy, an individual with preexisting health conditions 
no longer has to worry about being denied coverage or charged higher premiums by an insurer, 
and they may feel less reliant on spousal health insurance coverage. This paper contributes to the 
sparse literature examining how marital behavior is influenced by policy incentives that impact 
health insurance coverage. Two recent papers have studied the relationship between the ACA 
young adult provision and marital decisions. Abramowitz (2016) finds evidence that the 
provision led to a decrease in the likelihood of marriage and an increase in the probability of 
divorce among young adults. The study provides evidence that while spousal health insurance 
plans increase the value of marriage, being eligible to remain on parental insurance plans reduces 
incentives to remain married. In similar work, Barkowski and McLaughlin (2018) highlight the 
importance of accounting for pre-ACA state-level mandates by showing that young adults who 
were ineligible for such state-level mandates were less likely to marry prior to the ACA, while 
increasing their marriage rates following the ACA implementation. While a finding that the ACA 
dependent coverage provision impacted the marital decisions of young adults is interesting, we 
believe that an examination of whether the ACA preexisting conditions provision impacted 
marital decisions of individuals with health issues is also important. 
To the best of our knowledge, our study is the first to estimate the impact of the ACA 
preexisting conditions provision on marital status. Using longitudinal data from 2009 to 2015, 
and estimating difference-in-differences models, we test whether male household heads with 
preexisting conditions prior to 2014 changed their marital behavior following the implementation 
of the policy. We find a 5.15 percentage point reduction in the likelihood of being married for 
these men compared to those without any preexisting conditions, which corresponds to a 6.40 
percent change in marriage rates. We find that the effect is largest for men that were insured 
prior to 2014, and those that did not have their own employer-sponsored insurance coverage. 
Additionally, we find a negative and significant effect on marriage among those men who were 
covered by a spousal, employer-sponsored insurance plan, which we believe to be indication that 
they may have been particularly reliant on marriage in order to obtain health insurance benefits. 
'XHWRWKHQDWXUHRIWKHSROLF\XQGHUVWXG\RXUILQGLQJVDUHLQGLFDWLRQRI³PDUULDJHORFN´D
situation in which a couple remains married primarily for one partner to maintain health 
insurance coverage that he or she could not get otherwise.2 We show that the results are robust 
across a variety of specifications including propensity score matching methods and a fully 
flexible, dynamic difference-in-differences specification introduced by Mora and Reggio (2015). 
Finally, to alleviate concerns that the effect is being driven by other provisions of the ACA such 
as dependent coverage and Medicaid expansion, we show that results are largest for those 
between the ages of 30 and 45 and are not driven by individuals living in Medicaid expansion 
states. 
 The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section provides background 
information on the link between health insurance coverage and marriage as well as details 
regarding the ACA. Section three describes the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) data, 
while section four outlines our difference-in-differences, propensity score matching, and Mora 
and Reggio (2015) methodologies. Section five describes our findings and robustness checks. 
The final section provides further discussion and concludes. 
2. Background 
2.1 Marriage and Health Insurance Coverage 
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 Marriage lock is analogous to job lock, i.e., remaining at an employer primarily for insurance purposes. 
*DU\%HFNHU¶VHFRQRPLFPRGHORIPDUULDJH%HFNHULVEDVHGRQWZREDVLF
assumptions: 1) each individual tries to find a partner who maximizes his or her well-being, 
where well-being is measured by the consumption of household-produced commodities, and 2) 
the marriage market is in equilibrium. The model shows that gains from marrying compared to 
remaining single are positively correlated with income, human capital, and relative differences in 
wage rates. Becker (1973) shows that a necessary condition for marriage is that total output of 
the marriage must exceed the sum of maximum outputs of single individuals. Spousal health 
insurance coverage is a component of the value of marriage. A potential result of this could be 
that unhappily married people may decide to remain in their marriage because they fear that they 
will not be able to obtain insurance coverage on their own. Abramowitz (2016) notes that the 
benefit of obtaining insurance coverage through marriage could impact both coupled and single 
individuals. For single individuals, an available spousal plan may induce individuals to marry 
since insurance makes marriage more attractive. Similarly, for married individuals, a wider 
availability of alternative health insurance plans may make marriage less attractive, and induce 
them to get divorced. We hypothesize that in a pre-ACA world, individuals suffering from 
preexisting health conditions may be particularly influenced by these marriage channels.  
Prior literature has established the link between health insurance coverage and marriage. 
It has been shown that unmarried women are less likely to be insured than married women 
(Bernstein et al., 2008; Meyer and Pavalko, 1996), and that divorce leads to losses of coverage 
among women (Zimmer, 2007; Lavelle and Smock, 2012) and increases in individually-owned 
private coverage (Peters et al., 2014). Results from a survey in 2008 among a nationally 
representative random sample of 2,003 adults suggest that insurance might be a determinant of a 
FRXSOH¶VGHFLVLRQWRJHWPDUULHG.DLVHU)DPLO\)RXQGDWLRQ6HYHQSHUFHQWRIVXUYH\
respondents affirmed that a person in their household got married over the last year mainly to 
have access to health care benefits. Since individuals with preexisting conditions may have been 
particularly worried about being denied coverage prior to the ACA, insurance could have played 
a particularly large role in their marital decisions.  
Other work shows that marriage behavior is influenced by policies altering the costs and 
benefits of marriage. Yelowitz (1998) shows that the expansion of Medicaid eligibility beyond 
single-parent families significantly increases the likelihood of being married. Similarly, Chen 
(2013) shows that becoming eligible for Medicare at age 65 is associated with a seven percent 
increase in the likelihood of getting divorced, suggesting the presence of marriage lock among 
the near-elderly. Other studies show that marital decisions are influenced by changes to the Aid 
to Families with Dependent Children program (Moffitt, 1990) and to income taxes (Alm and 
Whittington, 1997, 1999). Researchers have shown that divorce is not only costly for individuals, 
but also to society. In a case study conducted for Texas, Schramm et al. (2013) provide evidence 
that the state spends $3.18 billion on divorce and its related consequences each year, which 
FRUUHVSRQGHGWRDURXQGSHUFHQWRIWKHVWDWH¶VWRWDOEXGJHWLQ,QVLPLODUZRUN for Utah, 
Schramm (2006) estimates that the 9,735 divorces in the state in 2001 cost the state and federal 
governments nearly $300 million in direct and indirect costs. Both studies emphasize that social 
policy should strengthen marriages and not provide economic incentives for individuals to get 
divorced. 
2.2 Pre-ACA Medical Underwriting 
The ACA preexisting conditions provision was introduced to improve health care access for a 
vulnerable group of the population: individuals with preexisting health conditions. Prior to the 
implementation of private insurance market rules in the ACA in 2014, health insurance sold in 
individual markets was medically underwritten in most states. That is, insurers evaluated the 
health status, health history, and other risk factors of applicants to determine the type of 
insurance plans an individual was eligible to receive (Claxton et al., 2016). This resulted in 
situations where individuals, particularly those with preexisting conditions, faced surcharged 
premiums, higher deductibles, or in many cases denial of coverage altogether.  
At any given time, the vast majority of the population with declinable preexisting 
conditions could attain health insurance through either an employer or through public programs 
such as Medicaid, and hence would not be subject to the medical underwriting practices of the 
individual marketplace. However, in the medium- or long-run, many of these individuals will 
eventually seek out coverage from the individual insurance market. According to Claxton et al. 
(2016), the need for individual market insurance is intermittent, and divorce is a common life 
HYHQWWKDWPD\OHDGWRWKHGLVUXSWLRQRIDQLQGLYLGXDO¶VJURXSFRYHUDJHDQGWKHVXGGHQQHHGIRU
private insurance.  
Prior to the ACA, medical underwriting of private insurance coverage posed serious 
issues for individuals with preexisting health problems. Applications for individual policies often 
included lengthy questionnaires about the health risk status of applicants and other members of 
the covered family. Before 2014, these practices were permitted in 45 states as well as in the 
District of Columbia. Levitt et al. (2013) estimate that, due to medical underwriting, 18 percent 
of applicants were denied coverage in the individual marketplace prior to the ACA. The authors 
point out that this estimate is likely a lower bound since it does not include individuals with 
preexisting conditions who were discouraged from applying for insurance altogether. 
3. Data 
3.1. Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) 
Our study uses data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), a nationally 
representative longitudinal sample of households and families interviewed annually since 1968 
and biannually since 1997. In our analysis, we follow individuals over the years 2009, 2011, 
2013, and 2015, which provides us with three survey waves prior to and one survey wave after 
policy implementation. The PSID gathers information reported by household heads, which by 
design are male individuals within married-couple families and either male or female individuals 
within single-parent homes.  
Given that the focus of this study is to test whether the preexisting condition provision 
led to changes in marital status, we examine the effects of the policy change for men since the 
share of married female household heads who have any preexisting conditions is less than 3 
percent of the PSID sample during our survey years. While the main focus of the study is to 
investigate marital behavior of male household heads, the PSID allows us to test whether 
behavior is affected differentially depending on whether the head of household or his partner has 
the preexisting condition. Given that the legal age of marriage in the U.S. is 18, and individuals 
become eligible for Medicare at the age of 65, our sample consists of individuals between the 
ages 18 and 64. Additionally, we exclude respondents with missing information on marital 
status. These restriction leave our analysis with a sample of 10,593 individuals and 42,372 total 
observations. 
In order to narrow our sample to a group of individuals that are likely affected by the 
preexisting conditions provision, we use responses in the survey to whether a doctor has ever 
diagnosed the survey participants with any of the following health conditions: stroke, heart 
attack, heart disease, lung disease, diabetes, cancer, and other serious chronic conditions, which 
LQFOXGHVFRQGLWLRQVVXFKDVVHL]XUHVNLGQH\GLVHDVHDXWRLPPXQHGLVRUGHU3DUNLQVRQ¶V disease, 
coronary problems, and bone disorder. The main treatment group of our study consists of 
individuals who report that they had at least one of the conditions in all three pre-policy survey 
years. This provides us with a treatment group of 1,534 individuals, for which we have 6,136 
total observations. For the control group, we consider people who report that they have no health 
conditions in all years prior to the reform (9,059 individuals and 36,236 observations).3 
The PSID provides several advantages to study the effect of the policy on marital 
behavior including its longitudinal nature, the fact that it covers individuals from all age groups 
and collects information on a number of health conditions. However, there are still some 
limitations with using the PSID. While we are using the latest available survey year (2015), this 
means that our analysis is only able to capture the early effects of the policy. Given that divorces 
can be rather lengthy and take significant time to process, we believe the results could be larger 
when including observations several years after the policy implementation. Another limitation of 
the PSID is that it only interviews household heads. This clearly limits us to focusing on the 
effects on marital behavior within a sample male household heads. Finally, an ideal data set for 
this study would provide information on whether respondents had actually been denied insurance 
coverage in the past, which is not available in the PSID or in other data sets as far as we are 
aware. 
3.2 Summary Statistics 
Table 1 provides summary statistics for the treatment and control group of the analysis. 
The statistics indicate that men forming the treatment group are 4.80 percentage points less likely 
to be married after policy implementation compared to the pre-policy survey years. Conversely, 
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 In an alternative specification, we find qualitatively similar results using a treatment group of individuals who 
report having had at least one of the conditions in 2013 (3,503 individuals). 
the likelihood of being married increases for members of the control group by 1.47 percentage 
points. The decline in the share of men with preexisting conditions who are married after the 
policy change is confirmed by Figure 1, which provides graphical evidence of changes in marital 
status between 2009 and 2015 for individuals in our sample. While relatively similar trends in 
the likelihood of being married are noticeable for the two groups during the years prior to the 
policy change, Figure 1 shows a larger decline in the likelihood of being married for individuals 
with preexisting conditions between 2013 and 2015. In order to check if individuals were 
potentially delaying divorce until after 2014, we examined aggregate U.S. divorce rates in the 
years prior to the policy change. According to statistics from the Center for Disease Control 
(CDC) and the National Center for Health Statistics (NCHS), divorce rates per 1,000 total 
population remained fairly similar during the pre-ACA years and even slightly declined between 
2011 and 2016 (CDC/NCHS, 2017).  
The summary statistics in Table 1 show that treated household heads are on average older 
and less likely to work compared to those in the control group, while the two groups are 
relatively similar in terms of race, education, and total family income. The bottom of Table 1 
shows statistics for the share of individuals in the treatment group reporting to suffer from 
various health conditions in the PSID during the pre-treatment period (2009, 2011 and 2013). 
The most prevalent condition is diabetes (44.59 percent), while shares of individuals who have 
had a stroke, heart attack, cancer, or heart and lung diseases are substantially smaller.  
4. Econometric Methods 
4.1 Difference-in-Differences 
Our study exploits the ACA prohibition of denial based on preexisting conditions 
provision to test for the effects of the policy change on marriage behavior. In the main empirical 
specification, we employ a difference-in-differences (DD) framework to observe the average 
treatment effects on a group of individuals that is most likely affected by the policy 
implementation. The main treatment group consists of heads of household who report that they 
have been diagnosed with at least one serious health condition in all survey observations prior to 
the policy change (2009, 2011, and 2013). In an alternative specification, individuals whose 
spouse had a preexisting condition throughout the pre-policy period form the treatment group. 
The control group consists of individuals who had no preexisting health conditions between 2009 
and 2013. We estimate the following equation to obtain average treatment effects:  
Yist ȕ0 ȕ1 Treatist ȕ2 Xist įDD Postist *Treatist Ȝ1 Yeart Ȝ2 StatesĮi  İist,      (1) 
where Yist is an indicator that equals one if individual i living in state s at time t is married and 
zero if he is either unmarried, widowed, divorced or separated. Treatist equals one if the 
individual suffers from a preexisting condition, while Postist equals one in the post-treatment 
period (2015) and zero in the three pre-treatment years (2009, 2011, and 2013). The inclusion of 
the vector Xist controls for observable individual characteristics, such as age, the number of 
children in the household, education, employment status, and total household income.4 
The main parDPHWHURILQWHUHVWLVįDD, which captures the effect of the policy on the 
likelihood of being married. Equation (1) controls for year and state fixed effects to account for 
existing differences in marital status across time and space. One concern is that if unobservable 
characteristics at the state-level cause divorce to spike in certain states, and individuals making 
up the treatment group may disproportionately live in these states. In additional models, we 
address this concern by including state-specific time trends. Finally, equation (1) also includes 
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 Additionally, we re-estimate our model when excluding employment status and total household income and find 
that the results remain almost unchanged. 
LQGLYLGXDOIL[HGHIIHFWVĮi), which allows us to account for time-invariant heterogeneity across 
individuals. The use of longitudinal data reduces any potential bias due to changes in the 
composition of the sample before and after the policy change. We estimate each of our DD 
specifications using linear probability models, with the standard errors clustered at the state 
level.  
While the main DD estimation for this study uses all heads of household who had 
preexisting conditions throughout the pre-policy period as the treatment group, we further exploit 
the longitudinal nature of the PSID in two additional DD specifications. First, we narrow the 
sample to individuals who were married in the pre-treatment years (2009-2013). Again, the two 
treatment groups consist of households where either the head or the spouse has at least one health 
condition before the policy change, respectively. This specification allows us to examine the 
effects of the policy on the flow of marriages more directly rather than the marriage stock. Using 
the stock of married people as an outcome could underestimate the magnitude of the effects of 
the provision (Abramowitz, 2016), and observing changes in marriage may capture policy effects 
more precisely.5 
Second, we use information on insurance status and narrow our sample even further to 
household heads with preexisting conditions who are covered by their spouse¶VLQVXUDQFHSODQLQ
the pre-policy years. While the sample size is smaller, this specification estimates treatment 
effects on a group of individuals that is most likely affected by the policy, since they may be 
particularly reliant on their marriage for health insurance. Thus, the results from this 
specification are closer to treatment effects on the treated. 
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 Similarly, Abramowitz and Dillender (2017) argue that using stock outcomes and flow outcomes may yield 
disparate results. 
4.2 Alternative DD Specifications 
4.2.1 Propensity Score Matching Difference-in-Differences Model 
To provide further robustness to the validity of our main DD estimates, we estimate 
propensity score matching DD models. This method allows us to compare the distribution of 
outcomes between individuals in the treatment group and their matched counterparts in the 
control group without having to make any functional form assumptions. Thus, our estimated 
treatment effects are weighted averages of the difference-in-differences between each of the 
treated individuals and his matched control. 
We use estimated propensity scores, which calculate the probability of treatment given a 
vector of observable characteristics, to match individuals who are treated to those who are 
similar but are not impacted by the policy change. The propensity scores are based on pre-
treatment variables and are estimated using probit models. Observable characteristics that are 
included to obtain the propensity scores are age, race, education, number of children, and state of 
residence. Following Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983), the use of a function of X, called the 
propensity scores P(X), rather than a potentially high-dimensional vector of covariates implies 
that:  
E (Y0 | D = 1, P(X)) = E (Y0 | D= 0, P(X)),    (2) 
where Y0 denotes the untreated state, D = 1 indicates treatment, and D = 0 indicates non-
treatment. Our analysis follows Heckman et al. (1998) DD matching methods, which use both 
comparisons between treated and non-treated, and differencing over time. Thus, the conditions 
needed to identify the average treatment effect on the treated (ATET) using the DD matching 
estimator are: 
E (Y0,t ± YW¶ | D = 1, P(X)) = E (Y0,t ± YW¶| D = 0, P(X)),      (3) 
ZKHUHWDQGW¶UHSUHVHQWWKHSRVW- and pre-treatment periods, respectively. Thus, the average 
treatment effect (ATE) provides a weighted average of the difference-in-differences between 
individuals in the treatment and control groups, and it is obtained by estimating the following 
equation: 
ATEDD = E(Y1t |D=1, P(Xí(<0t _' 3;í(<W¶ _' 3;í(<W¶ |D=0, P(X)).    (4) 
Our empirical analysis uses both nearest neighbor and kernel density matching on the 
propensity scores (Becker and Ichino, 2002). Standard errors are obtained following Abadie and 
Imbens (2016), who established how to account for the fact that propensity scores are estimated 
in the first stage. Figure 2 shows a balance plot for the propensity score matching conducted in 
our analysis. The figure suggests that our matching is successful and allows comparing the 
effects of the policy change between similar individuals in each the treatment and control groups.  
4.2.2. Mora & Reggio DD Model 
DD models require an assumption that trends in the variable of interest are similar for 
both treatment and control groups in the absence of the policy change. This assumption implies 
that without the treatment, differences between the groups are assumed to be time-invariant. 
Mora and Reggio (2015) point out that the identification of the treatment effect does not only 
depend on the parallel trends assumption, but also on the trend modeling strategy applied by 
researchers. For example, Mora and Reggio (2015) show that DD estimates will differ 
substantially depending on whether group-specific linear trends or group-specific, time-invariant 
linear trends are included in the analysis in order to accommodate for trend differentials between 
treatment and control groups. By arguing that researchers often overlook this fact, the authors 
introduce an alternative DD estimator, which identifies the effect of the policy using a fully 
flexible dynamic specification and includes a family of alternative parallel growth assumptions 
(Mora and Reggio, 2015). The two main advantages the authors list in favor of their DD estimate 
are that it: 1) allows for flexible dynamics and for testing restrictions on these dynamics; 2) does 
not impose equivalence between alternative parallel assumptions. Mora and Reggio (2015) show 
that this alternative estimator is acquired in two steps. In the first step, standard least squares 
estimation of the fully flexible model is conducted. In the second step, the solution of the 
equation in differences identifies the treatment effects. The Mora and Reggio (2015) fully 
flexible DD estimator is obtained from the following equation: 
 
where IĲWLVDGXPP\IRUSHULRGĲDQGȖD is a control for group differences in linear trends. 
Estimating this alternative model allows us to test the validity of standard DD assumptions made 
in our baseline specification, and a finding that the estimates obtained from this model are 
consistent with baseline estimates can provide evidence for additional robustness of the main 
results. 
4.3 Additional Models 
In addition to estimating alternative DD models, we conduct several robustness checks. 
We run two additional specifications that account for the ACA Medicaid expansions that took 
place in 26 states and DC in 2014, the same year as the preexisting conditions provision.6 We 
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 The states that expanded Medicaid in 2014 are: Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, 
District of Columbia, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Kentucky, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Nevada, 
New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Rhode Island, Vermont, 
Washington, and West Virginia. 
separately examine the impact of our policy change on marriage behavior of individuals with 
preexisting conditions in states that expanded Medicaid and the 24 states that did not. If 
Medicaid expansion is driving any differences in marriage rates between individuals with and 
without preexisting conditions, we would expect no changes in marital status in states that did 
not expect Medicaid. 
Another ACA provision that could have affected marital behavior is the 2010 dependent 
coverage mandate, which allows young adults to remain on parental insurance plans until the age 
of 26. Abramowitz (2016) provides evidence that the mandate reduced marriage rates among 
young adults. While the policy examined in this study was implemented four years later, any 
observed effects might still be related to the dependent coverage mandate. To empirically test for 
whether the dependent coverage mandate is driving any observed marriage effects, we re-
estimate our main DD model for four different age groups. If the 2010 dependent coverage 
provision drives our results, we would expect to find larger effects for individuals below the age 
of 27.  
We also check whether the effects differ between people who were insured and uninsured 
before the policy change. If an individual was uninsured prior to the policy, then we would 
expect to see no significant effect of the preexisting condition provision on their marital 
decisions (as they would not have been reliant on spousal insurance coverage in the pre-policy 
period). We also check for differences between those who had their own employer-sponsored 
coverage and those who did not. As the policy is most likely to impact individuals that are unable 
to attain their own employer-sponsored insurance coverage, we expect to see larger effects for 
those without this form of coverage in the pre-policy period. 
To provide additional validity to our main findings, we estimate a falsification and three 
placebo tests. A potential concern is that individuals with preexisting conditions are quite 
different than those without, and perhaps it is the worsening of RQH¶VFRQGition that eventually 
leads to a divorce. To mitigate concerns that differences in health outcomes might be driving any 
changes in marriage behavior, we estimate another DD specification where individuals with no 
preexisting conditions but poor self-reported health form the treatment group and those who have 
no conditions and are not in poor health form the control group. Since individuals making up the 
treatment group do not suffer from any preexisting conditions that would make them uninsurable 
under pre-ACA law, we would expect to see no significant effects of the preexisting conditions 
provision on their marital decisions. Finally, in three placebo tests, we re-estimate our main 
analysis for the time periods 2003-2009, 2005-2011 and 2007-2013 and create artificial 
treatment indicators. None of these time periods had changes in policy directly targeting the 
insurance needs of individuals with health conditions. Thus, if estimates using these artificial 
treatment indicators are statistically significant, it may be indication that our main results are 
spuriously driven by other changes that differentially affected individuals with and without 
preexisting health issues. 
Results 
5.1 Main DD Model 
Table 2 presents the main DD estimates from our analysis. In the main specification in 
Panel A, which includes all fixed effects and controls, we find that the policy change reduced the 
likelihood of being married among male household heads with preexisting conditions by 5.15 
percentage points (p<0.01). This corresponds to a 6.4 percent reduction compared to the baseline 
mean (0.805). We furthermore find that the results remain unchanged when adding state-specific 
time trends.7 In additional specifications, shown in Appendix Table A1, we include additional 
controls and show that the results are not driven by marriage or health history. We find that the 
main results remain almost unchanged when including controls for marriage length, the number 
of marriages, as well as the age when the preexisting condition first occurred.8 Panel A of Table 
2 also shows that the policy reduced the likelihood of being married by 3.24 percentage points 
for household heads whose spouse had a preexisting condition in the survey years prior to 2014 
(p<0.05). This suggests that marriage is affected independent of which partner has the 
preexisting condition.  
Panel B narrows down the sample to individuals who were married throughout the pre-
policy period in order to test whether the flow of marriages was impacted by the reform. Again, 
we find negative and statistically significant effects on the likelihood of remaining married for 
heads of household with health conditions as well as for individuals whose spouses have 
preexisting conditions. Finding consistent results for both the stock and flow of marriages 
provides additional evidence that the policy change affected marital behavior. 
Finally, we narrow the sample in Panel C to household heads who were covered by their 
VSRXVH¶VLQVXUDQFHSODQLQWKH\HDUVSULRUWRAs they would likely have been highly 
dependent on the marriage to attain affordable health insurance, individuals with preexisting 
conditions within this subsample are those who are most directly affected by the reform. In the 
full specification, and despite a low number of observations and potential issues with statistical 
power (325 treated individuals), we find a 3.93 percentage point decline (p<0.05) in the 
                                                          
7
 Six states (Maine, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, Vermont, and Washington) did not request detailed 
LQIRUPDWLRQDERXWDSHUVRQ¶VPHGLFDOKLVWRU\ZKHQWKH\WULHGWRSXUFKDVHLQVXUDQFHSULRUWRWKH$&$:HHVWLPDWHG
our main model excluding these states and found a decline in the likelihood of being married of 5.13 percentage 
points (p<0.01), which is almost identical to the main result. 
8
 In additional specifications, we exclude people in the control group whose spouse have at least one preexisting 
condition at some point during our study. The results remain unchanged are available upon request. 
likelihood of being married for this group of individuals. This furthermore suggests that the 
ability to obtain insuUDQFHFRYHUDJHLQGHSHQGHQWO\RIRQH¶VSDUWQHULQIOXHQFHGSHRSOH¶VGHFLVLRQV
of remaining married. 
5.2 Additional Results 
Table 3 presents estimates from several models testing the robustness and validity of our 
findings. Panel A shows treatment effects obtained from two different propensity score matching 
DD specifications. While the magnitudes for the nearest neighbor and kernel matching differ, 
they both provide evidence for of a statistically significant negative effect of the policy on the 
likelihood of being married (both p<0.01). Given that these estimates are in line with the 
standard DD estimates removes some concern about observable differences in the treatment and 
control groups (Table 1) and that these differences are driving the observed changes in marital 
behavior. Similarly, Panel B  shows a 4.03 percentage point reduction (p<0.05) in marriage when 
estimating the alternative DD model proposed by Mora and Reggio (2015), which provides 
evidence that the main DD estimates are robust to a more flexible, dynamic specification and to 
different parallel trends assumptions for the two groups. 
Panel C shows estimates for three placebo tests using different time periods and artificial 
policy indicators to ascertain that our main findings are not spuriously driven by other events or 
policy changes. The results from these models show that the artificial policy indicators have no 
effects on marriage behavior of individuals with preexisting conditions, which further suggests 
that the 2014 change in policy is driving our main findings.  
While the treatment group in our main analysis is formed by individuals who have at 
least one health condition in all three pre-policy survey years, we present estimates for each 
preexisting condition in Panel D. With the exception of heart attack, which shows an effect close 
to zero in magnitude, we find negative effects on marital behavior among all health conditions. It 
should be noted, however, that only the estimates for diabetes and other chronic conditions are 
statistically significant (both p<0.01). One explanation for this could be that, as shown in Table 
1, the share of individuals reporting these two conditions in substantially higher than for all other 
conditions.9 Thus, the lack of significance for the other health conditions may be related to a lack 
of statistical power.  
Panel E shows that the prohibition denying insurance based on preexisting conditions 
reduced the number of children in the household by 0.158 (p<0.05). According to statistics 
provided by the U.S. Census Bureau, mothers receive custody after divorces in more than 80 
percent of cases (U.S. Census Bureau, 2015). Thus, the observed decline in the number of 
children living with male household heads with preexisting condition is in line with the decrease 
in marriage rates among this group.10 
Finally, we estimate a falsification test for which we assign individuals without any 
preexisting conditions but poor self-reported health in all pre-policy survey waves to the 
treatment group, while individuals with no poor health and no health conditions form the control 
JURXS&RQVLVWHQWZLWKWKHIDFWWKDWWKHVH³WUHDWHG´LQGLYLGXDOVVKRXOGQRWEHDIIHFWHGE\WKH
ACA preexisting conditions provision, we do not find a statistically significant marriage effect 
for this alternative specification.  
5.3 Heterogeneous Effects 
                                                          
9
 :KHQIXUWKHUVHSDUDWLQJWKHGLIIHUHQWFRQGLWLRQVJURXSVXQGHU³RWKHUFKURQLFFRQGLWLRQV´ZHILQGWKDWPDUULDJH
behavior was most affected for people suffering from bone/joint disorders as well as autoimmune disorders or lupus. 
7KHUHVXOWVIRUWKHVHDGGLWLRQDO³RWKHUFKURQLFFRQGLWLRQVDUHDYDLODEOHXSRQUHTXHVW 
10
 The fact that the number of children is affected by the policy change suggests that it might me endogenous in the 
main specification examining the effects on marriage behavior. We find that our main results are unchanged when 
excluding the number of children from the model.  
Table 4 provides estimates for several subgroups of the population. Panel A presents 
results for individuals by pre-policy insurance status. The results suggest that our main findings 
are driven by individuals who had insurance coverage in the survey years prior to 2014. It 
appears unlikely that individuals that were uninsured prior to the policy would have felt tied to 
marriage due to health insurance. This result is in line with our previous finding of a significant 
effect among LQGLYLGXDOVWKDWZHUHFRYHUHGE\WKHLUVSRXVH¶VSODQSULRUWRWKHUHIRUP7DEOH
Panel C). In addition, we show that the effects are mainly driven by individuals who did not have 
their own employer-sponsored coverage before 2014. This would likely be a subgroup that is 
most likely to be reliant on spousal coverage. The estimates in Panel A provides further 
robustness to our main results since these individuals were likely to be most affected by the 
provision. 
Next, we examine whether the 2014 Medicaid expansions and the 2010 dependent 
coverage mandate, which were both part of the ACA, are driving the finding of our study. When 
separately testing for the effect of the preexisting conditions provision on marriage behavior in 
states that expanded Medicaid in 2014 and those that did not, we find statistically significant 
reductions in the likelihood of being married for both groups of states (Panel B). While the effect 
is larger in magnitude for states that experienced an expansion, a significant finding in non-
expansion states suggests that Medicaid changes are not driving the main results of this study. 
Panel C provides treatment effects for four age groups. While our results suggest that marriage 
behavior is affected across all groups (all p<0.01), the largest effect is found for individuals 
between ages 30 and 45, and the smallest effect is found for young adults between 18 and 26. 
While Abramowitz (2016) provides convincing evidence that the 2010 dependent coverage 
mandate affects marital decisions of young adults, Panel C provides additional evidence that the 
results in our study are the result of the 2014 preexisting provisions provision and are not driven 
by the dependent coverage provision.  
Panel D shows the effects of the policy also differed across education levels. While 
marriage behavior of individuals with less than 12 years of completed education is not 
significantly affected, we find reductions in the likelihood of being married of 4.88 percentage 
points (p<0.10) and 6.36 percentage points (p<0.01) for heads of household with 12 and more 
than 12 years of education, respectively. It seems plausible that these heterogeneous effects 
across education levels are due to varying levels in the understanding of health insurance and 
changes in policy, i.e., educated individuals are more likely to be aware of the preexisting 
conditions provision and its role in obtaining insurance coverage, and thus are more likely to 
respond to the policy. Also, highly educated people might be more likely to afford their own 
health insurance upon being eligible to do so after the reform.  
6. Conclusion 
Our findings indicate that the ACA preexisting conditions provision increased marital 
dissolution among men with health issues. Our main estimate indicates that male household 
heads with preexisting conditions are 6.40 percent less likely to remain married after the change 
in policy. Additionally, we find negative effects for males with preexisting conditions covered by 
spousal employer-sponsored insurance, a subgroup that would have been particularly reliant on a 
marriage to maintain coverage in the pre-ACA period. We show that our estimates are robust 
across a variety of specifications, including those that utilize propensity score matching. To 
mitigate concerns that the findings are driven by other parts of the ACA, such as the dependent 
coverage provision or Medicaid expansion, we conduct subgroup analyses to show that effects 
are not driven by young adults and are not unique to those living in Medicaid expansion states. 
Our estimates provide evidence that individuals with health conditions may have been 
particularly reliant on marriage prior to the ACA since insurance companies were able to deny 
them insurance coverage. We believe that our results are indication of marriage lock, i.e., 
remaining in a marriage primarily for health insurance purposes. The magnitudes of our findings 
are comparable with previous estimates of the effects of insurance access and changes in policy 
on marriage behavior. Abramowitz (2016) finds that the dependent coverage mandate decreased 
marriage rates by 8.8 to 9.3 percent among young adults, while Chen (2013) estimates a 7 
percent increase in the number of divorces for individuals with spousal insurance coverage upon 
achieving Medicare eligibility at age 65.  
By preventing insurers from denying coverage to individuals with preexisting conditions, 
the ACA may have added a level of relationship flexibility for people with health conditions. By 
freeing individuals from concerns that they may be denied coverage elsewhere or charged higher 
premiums, the preexisting conditions provision presumably lowers the benefits of marriage by 
making spousal insurance coverage less valuable. While likely not having an impact on the 
average person, the policy has the potential to influence marital decisions of those with 
preexisting conditions. Given the pre-ACA laws, individuals with preexisting conditions are 
most susceptible to marriage lock since the value of a spousal health insurance plan is amplified 
for those that have fears of being denied coverage elsewhere. Marriage lock among individuals 
with chronic conditions is a topic that is under-studied, and this paper both offers a better 
understanding of the insurance struggles of people with preexisting conditions and provides new 
evidence on the effects of the ACA on relationship dissolution outcomes. It is important to 
continue to track trends in marital behavior and other long-term outcomes related to well-being 
of individuals with preexisting conditions. Researchers should continue to examine potentially 
unintended consequences of the ACA and similar changes in policy to better understand the 
welfare implications of such reforms. 
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Figure 1: Proportion Married Across Time 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Propensity Score Matching Balance Plot 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
  Treatment Group Control Group 
Married   
Pre 0.8051 0.7474 
 (0.3961) (0.4345) 
Post 0.7571 0.7621 
 (0.4290) (0.4258) 
Age 47.7825 39.0415 
 (10.5326) (10.3855) 
Working 0.6598 0.8638 
 (0.4738) (0.3431) 
# Children in HH 1.0495 1.4942 
 (1.2727) (1.4018) 
White 0.6588 0.6361 
 (0.4741) (0.4811) 
Black 0.2836 0.3001 
 (0.4508) (0.4583) 
Other race 0.0575 0.0638 
 (0.2329) (0.2445) 
<12 years of education 0.1488 0.1500 
 (0.3559) (0.3571) 
12 years of education 0.3015 0.2915 
 (0.4589) (0.4545) 
>12 years of education 0.5497 0.5585 
 (0.4976) (0.4966) 
Total Household Income $83,936.40 $84,624.29 
 (66,654.37) (62,092.47) 
Stroke (pre) 0.0831 - 
 (0.2762)  
Heart attack (pre) 0.1504 - 
 (0.3575)  
Heart disease (pre) 0.1430 - 
 (0.3502)  
Lung disease (pre) 0.1117 - 
 (0.3150)  
Diabetes (pre) 0.4459 - 
 (0.4971)  
Cancer (pre) 0.1548 - 
 (0.3618)  
Other serious condition (pre) 0.3503 - 
 (0.4771)  
N 6,136 36,236 
Table 2: The Effects of the Policy Change on Marital Status 
 Panel A: All male heads of 
households Likelihood of being married 
  
  
Has a condition -0.0603*** -0.0515*** -0.0513*** 
 
(0.0163) (0.0161) (0.0162) 
    
Sample Mean 0.8051 
    
    
Spouse has a condition -0.0530*** -0.0324** -0.0301** 
 
(0.0135) (0.0151) (0.0153) 
    
Sample Mean 0.9280 
 
   
  
      
Panel B: Male heads of HH married 
between 2009 and 2013 
   
Has a condition -0.0299** -0.0306** -0.0298** 
 
(0.0133) (0.0134) (0.0134) 
    
    
Spouse has a condition -0.0359*** -0.0345*** -0.0355*** 
 
(0.0124) (0.0120) (0.0120) 
 
   
        
Panel C: Male heads of HH covered 
by wife's ESI pre-policy change 
   
Has a condition -0.0473** -0.0393** -0.0404** 
 
(0.0185) (0.0175) (0.0184) 
    
Fixed effects x x x 
Control variables 
 
x x 
State-specific time trends 
  
x 
        
Robust standard errors, clustered by states, are shown in parentheses. The control variables include age, race, education, 
employment status and household income. * p< 0.10, ** p< 0.05, *** p < 0.01.  
 
 
Table 3: Additional DD Results 
 DD Effect N 
Panel A: DD Propensity Score Matching   
Nearest Neighbour -0.0437*** 41,663 
 
(0.0031) 
 
Kernel Matching -0.1356*** 41,663 
 
(0.0059) 
 
   
Panel B:  
  
Alternative DD model (Mora and Reggio) -0.0403*** 42,372 
 
(0.0154) 
 
   
Panel C: Placebo Tests 
  
Pre: 2003-2005, Post 2007-2009 0.0056  40,432 
 
(0.0040) 
 
Pre: 2005-2007, Post 2009-2011 -0.0011 42,391 
 
(0.0031) 
 
Pre: 2007-2009, Post 2011-2013 0.0009  44,822 
 
(0.0034) 
 
   
Panel D: Type of Condition 
  
Stroke -0.0597 31,009 
 
(0.0377) 
 
Heart attack -0.0011 31,326 
 
(0.0334) 
 
Lung disease -0.0124 31,276 
 
(0.0266) 
 
Diabetes -0.0722*** 33,066 
 
(0.0183) 
 
Cancer -0.0203 31,367 
 
(0.0230) 
 
Other chronic condition -0.0391*** 32,648 
 
(0.0116) 
 
Panel E: 
  
Effects on # of children in HH -0.1583** 42,372 
 
(0.0670) 
 
Panel F: Falsification Test 
  
Poor health status as treatment indicator -0.0216 36,133 
 
(0.0586) 
 
Robust standard errors, clustered by state, are shown in parentheses. * p< 0.10, ** p< 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
Table 4: Heterogeneous DD Results 
 DD Effect Sample Mean N 
Panel A: Pre-2014 Insurance Status    
Uninsured -0.0197 0.6690  7,730 
 
(0.0151) 
  
Insured -0.0454*** 0.8302  33,933 
 
(0.0038) 
  
Employer-Sponsored Coverage -0.0181 0.9154  18,714 
 
(0.0140) 
  
No Employer-Sponsored Coverage -0.0809*** 0.7175  23,658 
 
(0.0220) 
  
    
    
Panel B: ACA Medicaid Expansions 
   
Expansion States -0.0657*** 0.8278  20,788 
 
(0.0234) 
  
Non-Expansion States -0.0456** 0.7822  21,255 
 
(0.0228) 
  
    
    
Panel C: Age 
   
18-26 -0.0338*** 0.4270  4,002 
 
(0.0118) 
  
27-29 -0.0547*** 0.7412  3,621 
 
(0.0114) 
  
30-45 -0.0961*** 0.7694  20,200 
 
(0.0059) 
  
46-64 -0.0430*** 0.8386  13,840 
 
(0.0051) 
  
    
Panel D: Education 
   
< 12 Years 0.0262 0.6935 6,242 
 
(0.0400) 
  
12 Years -0.0488* 0.7438  12,207 
 
(0.0273) 
  
> 12 Years -0.0636*** 0.8780  23,214 
 
(0.0217) 
  
        
Robust standard errors, clustered by state, are shown in parentheses. * p< 0.10, ** p< 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
 
Table A1: The Effects of the Policy Change on Marital Status  
(with Marriage and Health History Controls) 
 Likelihood of being married N 
Panel A: Controls for marriage 
history 
 
   
DD Effect -0.0463*** -0.0382*** -0.0344** 42,372 
 
(0.0154) (0.0141) (0.0141) 
 
     
Sample mean 0.8051  
 
     
Marriage length x 
 
x 
 
Number of marriages 
 
x x 
 
     
     
Panel B: Controls for health history 
    
DD Effect -0.0507*** -0.0525*** -0.0534*** 42,372 
 
(0.0160) (0.0158) (0.0159) 
 
     
Sample mean 0.8051  
 
     
Age condition first occurred - head x 
 
x 
 
Age condition first occurred - spouse 
 
x x 
 
          
Robust standard errors, clustered by states, are shown in parentheses. All models control for employment status,  
the number of children in the household, race, and education. Furthermore, individual, state and year fixed effects  
are controlled for. * p< 0.10, ** p< 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
 
